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First Amendment and "ForeignControlled" U.S. Corporations:
Why Congress Ought to Affirm
Domestic Subsidiaries' Corporate
Political-Speech Rights
ABSTRACT

Political spending in the modern-day, prolonged election
cycle continues to exceed historic proportions. With money
equated to speech, whether the FirstAmendment entitles certain
contributors to engage in this political activity remains an open
question. Unlike France and Israel, which prohibit corporate
contributions, and Canada and the United Kingdom, which
turn to public funding for campaign finance, the United States
has pushed candidates to rely on political party contributions,
personal wealth, and the generosity of individuals, political
action committees, and corporations. Concerns about corporate
and foreign influence on politics have been especially salient
during this lengthy economic downturn, as shown by the
prominence of the nationwide Occupy Wall Street protests.
Those who trumpet restrictions on so-called "foreign" corporate
political influence are concerned with infringements on U.S.
sovereign
independence and
citizens' political selfdetermination. This Note responds to the uproar against
corporate and foreign influence in the wake of Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission, arguing the debate in Congress
and, thus, the law, ought to distinguish between domestic
subsidiaries of foreign corporations and foreign corporations
themselves. Under the current legal regime, no distinction
between U.S. corporations and domestic subsidiaries exists;
despite proposed legislation to the contrary, it should remain
this way.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"High Court Allows Foreign Campaign Finance"' and other
deceptive headlines contributed to popular misunderstanding 2 of the
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ruling.3 Somehow,
journalists, law professors, think tanks, 4 members of Congress,5 and
even the President 6 confused the majority opinion.7 In the opinion's

1.
Elison Elliott, High Court Allows Foreign Campaign Finance, FOREIGN
POLY BLOGS (Jan. 31, 2010), http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/01/31/high-courtallows-foreign-campaign-finance.
2.
Scholars may equate misunderstanding with political jockeying. Though
this Note does not address whether Citizens United benefits one political party more
than another, this concern undoubtedly underlies the vehemence of proponents and
opponents alike. Constitutional-law scholar and former federal judge Michael
McConnell contends:
Citizens United is likely to benefit Democrats more than Republicans.
Corporations rarely make independent expenditures during candidate elections
in their own name, because the ads offend customers, workers and
shareholders. And direct corporate contributions to candidates tend to be split
more or less evenly between the two parties, largely neutralizing their effect.
But unions have no compunctions against running campaign ads, and almost
all of their money goes to Democrats.
Michael W. McConnell, Citizens United and the Wisconsin Vote, WALL ST. J., June 11,
2012, at All.
3.
While foreign influence certainly has penetrated the electoral system,
widespread influence does not occur, and Citizens United left the law regarding foreign
nationals undisturbed. See infra Part II.B.2.
4.
See Richard C. Leone, Duty Free, BLOG CENTURY (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://botc.tef.org/2012/01/duty-free.html (explaining that "domestic subsidiaries of
foreign corporations can spend" unlimited amounts of money on U.S. political
campaigns).
5.
U.S. Senator Max Baucus criticized and misrepresented the Citizens United
decision as permitting foreign corporations to contribute limitlessly in U.S. elections. In
describing the motivations behind his proposed constitutional amendment on campaign
finance, Baucus said, "Democracy means people have the power to elect a government
that represents them-not big business or foreign corporations." Charles S. Johnson,
Tester, Baucus Support Amending U.S. Constitution To Regulate Campaign Spending,
MISSOULIAN (Jan. 25, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://missoulian.com/news/local/tester-baucussupport-amending-u-s-constitution-to-regulate-campaign/article_958cbd2e-470e-11e1a62a-00187le3ce6c.html#ixzzlkd9NPMe4.
6.
Barack Obama, President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-unionaddress. Obama "warned that foreign interests would be able to 'spend without
limits'-a criticism that earned a rebuff from Justice Samuel Alito, who mouthed 'not
true,' while listening to Obama's address." Michael Beckel, CPAC Panel: 'Celebrate'
Citizens United Ruling, NJTODAY.NET (Feb. 13, 2012), http://njtoday.net/2012/02/13/cpacpanel-celebrate-citizens-united-ruling/#ixzzlmllSRpZO.
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wake, legislators have stoked fear of foreign corporate influence and
have made U.S. corporations with foreign links the target of
legislative proposals. The Citizens United Court, however, was not
tasked with addressing-and indeed did not address-foreign
political influence. At issue was the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002 (BCRA) prohibition on corporate sponsorship of electioneering
communications, 8 and the 5-4 decision held that corporations and
unions may make unlimited independent expenditures from their
general treasury funds on political advertisements.9 After Citizens
United, the ban on direct contributions by corporations in 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b remains valid.' 0 Ever since the Court's ruling (and especially
in the lead-up to the 2012 elections), opponents have called for a
reversal. In fact, more than two-thirds of the public opposes the
Court's holding."1
Last term, the Supreme Court Justices seized an opportunity to
revisit their precedent after the Montana Supreme Court ignored
Citizens United and upheld a state law regulating corporate political
spending.' 2 Reversing the Montana Supreme Court, the Supreme
Court found the "holding of Citizens United applie[d] to the Montana
state law."' 3 Neither of these cases, however, asked the Court to
reach a decision on whether the "[g]overnment has a compelling

Despite sensationalist headlines and President Obama's rebuke of the
7.
Supreme Court during his 2010 State of the Union Address, the Citizens United Court
did not "open the floodgates" to foreign involvement in campaign finance.
Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 7
8.
(2012); see also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81, 91 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006)).
Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011
9.
UTAH L. REV. 433, 442; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct.
876, 911-13 (2010) (holding that the federal government cannot restrict corporate
political speech in the form of independent expenditures). Though Citizens United
addressed federal laws censoring corporate political expenditures, the decision also
"rendered unconstitutional state and local laws prohibiting corporate independent
expenditures." Matt A. Vega, The First Amendment Lost in Translation:Preventing
ForeignInfluence in U.S. Elections After Citizens United v. FEC, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
951, 986, n.214 (2011).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006).
10.
Associated Press, Most Oppose Unlimited Corporate Campaign Spending,
11.
EXAMINER (July 17, 2012), http://washingtonexaminer.com/most-oppose-unlimitedcorporate-campaign-spending/article/feed/2012822#.UDeWIaD7Wuk.
Some legal scholars feared the Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.-led court
12.
would issue a summary reversal, which essentially rules on the merits of the case
without full briefing or oral argument and gives no indication of the opinion's
-authorship. See Adam Liptak, Mystery of Citizens United Sequel Is Format, Not
Ending, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/us/in-citizensunited-ii-how-justices-rule-may-be-an-issue-itself.html. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
did issue an unsigned, per curiam opinion, overturning the Montana state law in a 5-4
decision.
Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012).
13.
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interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from
influencing our Nation's political process."14
During oral arguments, counsel for Citizens United suggested
that the constitutionality of limiting donations from foreigncontrolled corporations would depend on whether the government
"established a compelling governmental interest and a narrowly
tailored remedy to that interest."' 5 Justice Stevens's dissent in
Citizens United suggests the majority's rationale would "appear to
afford the same protection to multinational corporations controlled by
foreigners as to individual Americans."16 This Note explores and
answers the constitutional and policy question of whether the law
ought to view domestic subsidiaries differently from other
corporations in the campaign-finance context.' 7 The answer is a
resounding no. 18
American society's political discourse demonstrates a fixation on
the role of corporate money and foreign influence.' 9 Couple those
pervasive concerns with frustrations with the "inside the Beltway"
political culture and special-interests lobbyists-largely due to
corruption concerns 2 0-and
the frenzy following Citizens United
becomes self-explanatory. Political speech protectionism, among other
concerns, motivates opponents to Citizens United who aim to distance
domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations from the political
process. 2 ' But these multinational enterprises that do business and

14.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. The conclusions reached in Citizens
United "are not binding on the very different question of whether the government has a
compelling state interest in preventing foreign influence or distortion vis-A-vis the
financial participation of foreign-controlled or foreign-owned domestic corporations in
U.S. elections." Vega, supranote 9, at 951.
15.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral
arguments/argument transcripts/08-205[Reargued].pdf.
16.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 947-48.
17.
Anthony Johnstone refers to the line between domestic and foreign political
speakers as a "puzzle" in the First Amendment doctrine of campaign-finance law.
Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 413,
456 (2012).
18.
See id. at 439 (arguing that "the rationale, if not the holding, of Citizens
United calls into question the justification for remaining limits, including foreign
campaign spending restrictions and even contribution limits").
19.
Illegal political contributions rose to 4 percent in 2011, based on the views
of private-sector U.S. workers. ETHICS RES. CTR, 2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS
SURVEY 24 (2012), available at www.Ethics.org/nbes/files/FinalNBES-web.pdf.
20.
Transparency International, the global coalition against corruption, studies
the laws governing campaign finance, recognizing "opportunities for purchasing
influence in government are not confined to the electoral process." Corporate Funding
and Buying of Influence, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://archive.transparency.org/global
priorities/corruption politics/corporate funding (last visited Dec. 9, 2012).
21.
Opponents have raised several approaches that may permit the financial
participation of "foreign-controlled and foreign-owned domestic corporations to be
restricted, even banned" under the First Amendment: (1) lowering the standard of
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incorporate in the United States should have access to the political
process commensurate to their status as contributing "American"
stakeholders in the U.S. economy. Moving away from politically
charged sentiments, there is no de jure problem with restricting the
activities of foreign individuals. In fact, the law has spoken on voting
restrictions to minimize foreign manipulation of the political process,
with citizenship and residence requirements laid out in the
Constitution, 22 export controls concerning non-U.S. persons,23 and
citizenship requirements for jury service. 24
Though citizens and elected officials express fear over foreign
influence in governance and politics, the law nonetheless allows for it
in some instances. Most blatantly, U.S. participation in international
organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the United Nations allows foreign nations to direct policy
to some extent. Moreover, corporate law permits foreign shareholders
in U.S. corporations. Finally, foreign-owned press, like the
Economist2 5 and the Wall Street Journal,26 may editorialize, print,
and distribute foreign political opinions to Americans. Foreign-owned
news outlets like the Fox News Channel2 7 may also broadcast
political speech.

judicial review to intermediate scrutiny, (2) applying an "antidistortion" rationale, or
(3) narrowly tailoring legislation to cover speech impermissibly "coordinated" with
foreign principals." Vega, supra note 9, at 959.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring representatives to meet age and
22.
residency requirements limiting who may run for office and, therefore, for whom one
may vote); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (creating residency and age requirements for
presidential candidates that have the same effect).
See International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R §§ 120-130 (2012)
23.
[hereinafter ITAR]; Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774 (2012). A
non-U.S. person is defined as "any foreign corporation ... or group that is not
[currently] incorporated or organized to do business in the U.S." ITAR, supra, § 120.16.
See Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 138 (D. Md. 1974) (holding that
24.
jury service may be limited to citizens of a community).
The Economist Group, which has individual and institutional European
25.
shareholders, owns the Economist. See Results and Governance: Ownership, EcONoMIST
(last
http://www.economistgroup.com/results-andgovernance/ownership.html
GROUP,
visited Dec. 9, 2012).
In 2007, Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation acquired Dow Jones &
26.
Company, publishers of the Wall Street Journal. By early 2012, voting stock held by
foreign investors rose above the 25 percent limit set by the Communications Act of 1934.
News Corporation, in turn, suspended those voting rights of select non-American
shareholders. News Corp To Act on U.S. Ownership Breach: WSJ, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/18/us-newscorp-foreignownership-idUSBRE83HOAG
20120418.
News Corporation, a global media company, also owns the Fox News
27.
Channel. Fox News Channel, NEWS CORPORATION, http://www.newscorp.com/
management/foxnewschannel.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
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Given that political speech activates the "fullest and most urgent
application" of the First Amendment,2 8 this Note addresses the
Supreme Court's opinion and its implications for corporate actors,
specifically domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations. Other
studies address broader corporate influence on electoral politics in the
United States and abroad,29 including the impact on corporate
contributions post-Citizens United.30 Restricting itself to the question
of foreign-linked U.S. corporations, this Note argues that American
subsidiaries of foreign corporations and foreign-controlled U.S.
corporations31 should share the same rights to political speech as
"American" corporations.
Legal reasons for rejecting congressional attempts to ostracize
domestic subsidiaries and ensuring equal treatment stem from the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on free speech, treaty obligations,
presidential primacy over Congress in an area arguably of foreign
policy, and the fact that other areas of the U.S. legal system treat
domestic subsidiaries the same as other U.S. corporations. From a
policy perspective, the demands of the regulatory state imposed on all
corporations, the taxes paid by domestic subsidiaries, the sizeable
number of U.S. citizens who work for domestic subsidiaries, and an
interest in attracting foreign investment all counsel in favor of equal
treatment. Discriminating against domestic subsidiaries of foreign
corporations would only add to the "bizarre and incongruous
regulations" surrounding political finance. 32 This Note considers each
of these justifications.

28.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010)
(quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)).
29.
The United Kingdom places no limits on the amount corporations may
donate. And in Brazil, corporations donate nearly all of the money spent; of President
Dilma Rouseffs donations, almost 98 percent came from corporations. Nick Thompson,
International Campaign Finance: How Do Countries Compare?, CNN (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://articles.cnn.com/20l2-01-24/world/world_global-campaign-finance-1_partyspending-public-funding-political-parties?_s=PM:WORLD.
Cf. Shutting Up Business: Now Unions Are Turning to Shareholder
30.
Proposals To Limit Political Speech, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702042246045770 30260580411048.html
("As it is, 57 of the S&P 500 companies already either don't spend on politics or disclose
their political spending on their websites.").
31.
U.S.-headquartered companies that are "highly subsidized by a profitable
overseas subsidiary . . . could be beholden to foreign interests as a matter of
pragmatism to an even greater degree than a U.S. subsidiary might be as a matter of
corporate structure." ORG. FOR INT'L INV., WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR THE SENATE RULES
COMMITTEE HEARING ON: CORPORATE AMERICA V. THE VOTER: EXAMINING THE
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION To ALLOW UNLIMITED CORPORATE SPENDING IN
ELECTIONS 3 (2010), available at http://www.ofii.org/docs/OFII-StatementforSenate_

RulesCmte.pdf.
Nathan Persily, The Law of American Party Finance, in PARTY FUNDING
32.
AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 213, 219 (Keith D. Ewing &

Samuel Issacharoff, eds. 2006).
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Part II of this Note explores the theories of campaign finance and
current laws and regulations. Part III traces the Supreme Court's
corporate political-speech jurisprudence from Buckley v. Valeo to
Citizens United, placing special emphasis on the Supreme Court's
rationales, which may provide guidance as to how the Court would
consider restrictions on domestic subsidiaries. Part IV presents
detailed arguments for treating subsidiaries and foreign-controlled
U.S. corporations the same as other U.S. corporations. Finally, Part V
considers legislative and corporate responses to Citizens United.33
II. BACKGROUND

Whether campaign-finance law characterizes-or should
characterize-domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations as foreign
was not at issue in Citizens United. The Supreme Court's holding,
however, did strike down restrictions on corporations' independent
political expenditures, 34 finding no constitutional distinction between
an individual and a corporation under the First Amendment. 35 The
Supreme Court faces the same controversy over whether a
corporation constitutes a "person" under the law in the pending
Kiobel case, which involves the liability of corporations for human
rights violations. 36 Election law also has yet to settle "on a single,
coherent conception of the corporation-what it is, what values it
serves, and what role it should play in politics." 37 Some scholars have
argued for a narrower view of corporate personhood, viewing it "as
only the recognition of a corporation's ability to hold rights in order to
protect" the individuals behind it.38 This Note, however, accepts the

33.
Larry E. Ribstein, The FirstAmendment and CorporateGovernance, 27 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2011) ("Citizens United shifted the debate over corporate
speech from corporations' power to distort political debate to the corporate governance
processes that authorize this speech.").
34.
Corporate plaintiffs in Montana challenged whether state legislation may
ban corporate independent expenditures. After the Montana Supreme Court found
Citizens United did not prohibit the state's ban, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and
held that Citizens United applied to Montana state law. See Am. Tradition P'ship v.
Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012)
35.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010)
(quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)) ("The identity of
the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations
and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster.").
The Supreme Court is expected to issue a decision in 2013 on whether a
36.
corporation may be liable under the Alien Tort Statute. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011), grantingcert. to 621 F.3d 111 (2010).
37.
Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
1243, 1243 (1999).
38.
Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving CorporatePersonhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV.
1629. Public and legislative debate historically did not equate corporations with
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basic premise of Citizens United, which rejected a distinction between
corporate and individuals' speech.39
A. Campaign-FinanceOptions
In the Tillman Act of 1907, Congress banned direct corporate
contributions to federal candidates and national party committees.
Only in 1947 did Congress extend the ban to labor unions via the
Taft-Hartley Act. 40 In 1979, after tightening regulations in response
to Watergate, the post-Buckley Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA) amendments created the "soft-money" loophole, allowing
corporations, unions, and the wealthy to give unlimited sums to the
national party committees for "party-building" activities. 41 Currently,
the corporate decision to engage in political speech remains subject to
"the same rules as ordinary business decisions, which give directors
and executives virtually plenary authority."42
Understanding the basic campaign-finance-law landscape is
requisite to an analysis of whether domestic subsidiaries of foreign
corporations should face any political-speech restrictions and, if so, in
what forms. Campaign finance can come from private and public
sources. These sources include individuals, the candidates' political
party entities, political action committees (PACs), and the candidates
themselves.
There are two "central doctrinal distinctions in the Court's
campaign-finance law-between contributions and expenditures and
between express advocacy and issue advocacy." 4 3 The fuzzy

individuals in the field of election law, instead emphasizing internal distinctions within
the corporate form. Adam Winkler, "Other People'sMoney": Corporations,Agency Costs,
and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 873, 938 (2004) ("The result was that the
corporation was denied rights of political participation otherwise enjoyed by natural
individuals.").
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 ("The Court has thus rejected the
39.
argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated
differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not
'natural persons."'). Even after the Bellotti Court's "speech is speech" approach, the
"corporate form mattered" and was an adequate justification for special regulation. See
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 117 (2003); Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 153-55 (2003); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right To Work
Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207-11 (1982); Richard Briffault, On Dejudicializing American
Campaign Finance Law, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 887, 893 (2011).
Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, §§ 304, 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159
40.
(1947).
41.
A Century of U.S. Campagin Finance Law, NAT'L PUB. RADIO,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=121 2 9 3 3 8 0 (last visited Dec. 9,
2012).
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Corporate Political Speech: Who
42.
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 83 (2011).
Briffault, supra note 39, at 889.
43.
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categorieS44 of "expenditures" and "contributions" have "become lessthan-ideal proxies for whether strict scrutiny or intermediate

scrutiny applies."4 5 In McConnell v. FederalElection Commission, for

example, the Supreme Court evaluated contribution limits under the
less rigorous "closely drawn" scrutiny. 46 Burdens on political speech
in the form at issue in this Note remain subject to the strict scrutiny
standard, so Congress must remain cognizant of this when weighing
its regulatory options. 47 To pass the strict scrutiny test, the
Government must prove that the restriction "furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."48 Citizens
United deemed
restrictions
on
corporations'
independent
expenditures unconstitutional without disturbing the federal ban on
direct contributions to candidates and parties.4 9 Thus, regulation of
domestic subsidiaries' corporate political speech in the form of
independent expenditures remains subject to the strict scrutiny
approach.
Independent expenditure refers to expenditure "expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate" but
not in conjunction with the candidate or his campaign.5 0 Direct
contributions, on the other hand, involve donations directly to a
candidate's campaign for use as it sees fit.5 ' Beyond campaign
spending from the corporate treasury on independent expenditures,

44.

The Court has recognized that expenditures coordinated with a
candidate's campaign present the same dangers of corruption and the
appearance of corruption as contributions and, accordingly, has held
they may be regulated like contributions. However, the Court has
rejected the idea that independent expenditures that aid a candidate
and are just as likely to cause a candidate to feel obligated to the
spender as to the donor of a comparable amount of money to the
candidate's campaign can be limited.

Id. at 900.
45.
Vega, supra note 9, at 989.
46.
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 141 (2003).
47.
See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (noting that under the Warren Court, scrutiny that "was
'strict' in theory and fatal in fact" proliferated after the early 1960s). "Strict in theory,
but fatal in fact" refers to the unlikelihood of laws passing constitutional muster under
the strict scrutiny standard; however, empirical studies have successfully challenged
this notion. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the FederalCourts, 59VAND. L. REV. 793, 794-95 (2006).
48.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010)
(quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464
(2007)).
49.
See id. at 913.
50.
11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a) (2011).
51.
Some countries, such as India, face a substantial "under the table corporate
contributions" problem, with upwards of $2 billion in so-called "black money" spent to
influence the Uttar Pradesh state elections alone. Thompson, supra note 29.
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corporations retain other avenues to engage in political speech,
including contributing to PACs, spending money on direct lobbying
efforts, and "utilizing corporate funds to encourage employees [and
shareholders] to support or oppose a particular candidate or issue."52
The term PAC refers to two distinct types of political committees
registered with the Federal Election Commission (FEC): separate
segregated
funds (SSFs) 5 3 and nonconnected
committees.5 4
Corporations, labor unions, membership organizations, and trade
associations employ SSFs as a conduit for soliciting contributions
exclusively from "individuals associated with" their organizations.
Corporate entities cannot make direct contributions to federal SSFs.5 6
Nonconnected committees, on the other hand, are unconnected to "the
aforementioned entities and are free to solicit contributions from the
general public."5 7 Independent expenditure-only committees, more
commonly known as super PACs, have particular force as domestic
corporations and unions5 8 may make unlimited and, under certain
circumstances, anonymous donations to them. Further, corporations
may cover the administrative and operating expenses of the PACs.5 9
Individuals may donate up to $5,000 to a particular PAC annually.60

B. Domestic Subsidiariesand Foreign-Controlled
CorporationsUnder the Law
Though corporate independent expenditures from foreign-linked
corporations remain minimal compared to overall PAC spending,
globalization promises to increase the presence of such corporations
and their political spending in the United States. Consequently,
Congress ought to define the framework of permissible influence. The
legislative proposals brought forward in the wake of Citizens United

52.
Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free
Speech and CorporatePersonhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 507
(2010).
53.
"A separate segregated fund (SSF), often referred to as a PAC, is primarily
a bookkeeping arrangement used by corporations and other organizations to further
their political ends." Daniel Scott Savarin, CurtailingForeign FinancialParticipation
in Domestic Elections:A ProposalTo Reform the FederalElection CampaignAct, 28 VA.
J. INT'L L. 787, 797 (1987).
54.
SSFs and Non-Connected PACs, FED.
ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ssfvnonconnected.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
55.
Quick Answers to PAC Questions, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers pac.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2012) (noting that 2
U.S.C § 441b prevents nonprofit and profit corporations from making direct
contributions to political campaigns).
56.
SSFs and Non-Connected PACs, supra note 54.
57.
Quick Answers to PAC Questions, supra note 55.
58.
While unions also benefit from Citizens United, this Note does not provide
descriptive and normative treatments of them.
59.
SSFs and Non-Connected PACs, supra note 54
60.
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(C) (2006).
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do not treat domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations equal to
thoroughbred domestic corporations. This subpart begins to address
arguments for permitting foreign-linked political speech.
1.

Domestic Subsidiaries and Their Influence

Interestingly, SOE Software, the corporation that supplies the
election software that records, counts, and reports votes in hundreds
of jurisdictions nationwide, is a domestic subsidiary of a Spanish
corporation. 61 Though a subsidiary of a foreign corporation, SOE
Software maintains its headquarters in Tampa, Florida. 62
The global economy has removed the ease with which one may
determine whether a corporation is foreign. Besides considering a
corporation's place of incorporation-a mere legal formality-one may
clarify the "foreign" nature of a corporation by examining the
composition of a corporation's workforce, the division of ownership,
the make-up of its board of directors, the location of its headquarters,
and the countries in which it holds the highest market share. None of
these elements alone is dispositive of when foreign interests play a
meaningful role. For example, General Electric, an iconic American
corporation incorporated in New York, has its headquarters in
Connecticut but more employees overseas than in the United
States.6 3
The following chart lists some major U.S. companies with foreign
parent corporations and shows whether or not they have companysponsored PACs, as opposed to industry PACs that they may choose
to support. 64 Each of these entities has a SSF-not a super PAC.

61.
Michelle Malkin, Voter FraudFacts and Fiction,FLA. TIMES-UNION (May 9,
http://m.jacksonville.comlopinion/blog/406107/carol-boonve/2012-05-09/new2012),
syndicated-columns.
About SOE Software, SOE SOFTWARE, http://www.soesoftware.com/
62.
company/company.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
CURRENT REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES
63.
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (Oct. 1, 2012); Ken Chan,
Should ForeignersFace Limits on Political Speech?, JUSTIA.CoM LAW TECH. & LEGAL
MARKETING BLOG (Apr. 12, 2012), http://onward.justia.com/ 2011/04/21/shouldforeigners-face-limits-on-political-speech/.
64.
About Bridgestone Americas, Inc., BRIDGESTONE, http://www.bridgestonefirestone.com/about-bgindex.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2012); Foreign-ConnectedPACs,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/foreign.php (last visited Oct. 17,
2012); Membership List, ORG. INT'L INVESTMENT, http://www.ofii.org/mission/
membership-list.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). Employee information was obtained
from Bloomberg Law. See BLOOMBERG LAw, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/ (last
visited Dec. 9, 2012).
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ForeignParents
Foreign Parent
Corporation (Country of
Incorporation)

Employees

Company
PAC

2,800

Yes

Allianz SE (Germany)

43,000*

Yes

Bridgestone Corp. (Japan)

400

Yes

Deutsche Post AG (Germany)

America, Inc.

7,914

No

Electrolux AB (Sweden)

Lafarge North
America Inc.

16,400

Yes

Lafarge SA (France)

L'Oreal USA, Inc.
McCain Foods USA,

9,800

No

L'Oreal SA (France)

Inc.

4,300

No

Miller Brewing Co.

6,000

Yes

McCain Foods Ltd. (Canada)
SABMiller
PLC
(United
Kingdom)

Nestle Purina
PetCare Co.

6,749

Yes

Nestl6 SA (Switzerland)

Volkswagen Group
of America

3,000

Yes

Volkswagen AG (German)

U.S. Company
Allianz Life
Insurance Co. of
North America
Bridgestone
Americas, Inc.
DHL Express USA,
Inc.
Electrolux North

* The Company's web site listed over 43,000 in the "Americas."

Domestic subsidiaries' contributions comprise only a sliver of the
magnitude of money spent on electoral politics. 65 In the 2007-2008
presidential election cycle, there was record spending of nearly $1.2
billion by PACs. 66 But PACs of companies more than 50 percent
foreign-owned contributed only $16.8 million to federal candidates,
which amounted to less than 1 percent of 2007-2008 PAC
contributions. 6 7 In the 2010 federal election cycle, U.S. subsidiaries of
foreign companies donated about $15.5 million through "foreign-

65.

Cf lain McMenamin, If Money Talks, What Does It Say?: Varieties of

Capitalism and Business Financing of Parties, 64 WORLD POL. 1, 4-5 (2012) ("When
compared to the potential value of benefits, business spends very little on political
contributions.").

66.

Alan Fram, Number of Political Action Committees Hits Record,

HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2009, 10:35 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/
14/number-of-political-actio n_174933.html.

67.

Erin Williams, Foreign Subsidiaries Get Political, Evan Bayh for 'Fair

Elections' and More in Capital Eye Opener, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Mar. 9, 2010, 12:00
PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/03/foreign-subsidiaries-get-polit.html.
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controlled PACs." 68 Based on FEC data released in October 2012,
foreign-connected PACs had raised nearly $13 million in the current
election cycle. 69
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations employ 5.3 million
people, pay $26.6 billion in U.S. corporate tax payments-not to
mention state and local income and property taxes-and invest in
their domestic infrastructure, operations, and research and
development.7 0 The Organization for International Investment, a
business association for U.S. subsidiaries, professes awareness of "no
meaningful controversy or even a credible allegation about actual
foreign influence being brought to bear on American elections via a
domestic subsidiary of a company acting within the parameters" of
the FEC regulations. 7 ' Despite this industry statement, Congress
continues to explore regulating domestic subsidiaries.7 2
2.

Framework of Permissible Foreign Influence

American fear of foreign influence dates to the constitutional era
when it was at the forefront of the Framers' discourse.7 3 From the
Constitution to modern legislative enactments, the United States has
a history of prohibiting foreign influence in its politics. 74 Restrictions
on extraterritorial electioneering stem from four sources: the

Vega, supra note 9, at 956 (citing Foreign-Connected, supra note 64 (select
68.
"2010")).
Foreign-ConnectedPACs, supra note 64; see also Steve Rennie, Canadian69.
Owned Firms Are Funding U.S. Election Campaigns, GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 18, 2012,
http://www.theglobeandmail.cominews/world/canadian-owned-firms-are8:27 AM),
3
funding-us-election-campaigns/article234 098/?utmmedium=Feeds%3A%20RSS%2F
Atom&utmsource=World&utmcontent=2343098 (noting that U.S. subsidiaries of
Canadian companies' PACs donated $163,500 to candidates in U.S. Congressional
elections through February 2012).
Insourcing Facts, ORG. INT'L INVESTMENT, http://www.ofii.org/resources/
70.
insourcing-facts.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2012)
Letter from Org. for Int'l Inv. to Fed. Election Comm'n (Oct. 22, 2010),
71.
available at www.ofii.org/docs/OFIIFEC_Letter%20to%20FEC102210.pdf.
It is far more likely that foreign individuals will contribute to elections in
72.
the United States than a foreign corporation will, making regulations for these parties
less controversial.
Foreign corruption was of paramount concern during the Federal
73.
Convention of 1787. Vega, supra note 9, at 960 (citing Zephyr Teachout, The AntiCorruptionPrinciple, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 347 (2009)). Hamilton expressly argued
the republic form of government too easily provided an opening for "foreign corruption."
THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 435 (Alexander Hamilton).
Zephyr Teachout, ExtraterritorialElectioneering and the Globalization of
74.
American Elections, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 162, 169 (2009). This fear reflects an
underlying concern with foreign interests affecting actual U.S. policy, which
supposedly diminishes the voter's right to self-determination. See Savarin, supra note
53, at 789 (1987) ("Foreign contributors, by influencing the outcome of domestic
elections are able to alter both the composition and agenda of the U.S. political
leadership.").
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Constitution,7 5 the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the FEC.7 6
First, the Constitution prohibits foreign office holding and
foreign gifts to public officers." Next, FARA, enacted in 1938,
originally required employees of foreign nations or organizations to
register with the Secretary of State for permission to distribute
propaganda within the United States.7 8 Congress later amended
FARA to prohibit any "agent of a foreign principal" from knowingly
offering to or actually contributing to electoral or political activities in
the United States.79 Though agent was not clearly defined, FARA's
definition of foreign principal included foreign business entities.8 0

Notably, businesses organized under U.S. laws, and with their
principal place of business in the United States, were not subject to
these prohibitions.8 1
The FCC prohibits foreign ownership of media.8 2 Section 310 of
the Communications Act establishes guidelines for when a foreign
national is eligible to apply for a broadcast license. 83 The FCC issued
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in fall 2011 and has
considered "how to simplify the application of the foreign ownership
restrictions that appear in the Communications Act." 84
The FEC was established thanks to a 1974 amendment to
FECA.85 In 1976, Congress granted the FEC authority to implement
and enforce the Bentsen Amendment, discussed in greater detail

75.
"[N]o person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without
the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any
kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
76.
Teachout, supra note 74, at 172.
77.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
78.
52 Stat. 601 (1938) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 611 (2006)); Evan C.
Zoldan, Note, Strangers in a Strange Land: Domestic Subsidiaries of Foreign
Corporationsand the Ban on Political Contributionsfrom Foreign Sources, 34 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 573, 576-77 (2003).
79.
See Zoldan, supra note 78 (noting that the 1966 amendments "reflected
Congress' decision that foreign corporations would be treated with suspicion; their
primary designation would be as agents of foreign powers rather than as corporations,
qualified by the nationality of their owners").
80.
22 U.S.C. § 611(b) (2006) ("The term 'foreign principal' includes ... a
partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other combination of persons
organized under the laws of or having its principal place of business in a foreign
country.").
81.
Savarin, supra note 53, at 792.
82.
47 U.S.C. § 310(b).
83.
Id.
84.
Donald Evans, FCC Seeks Further Input on Foreign Ownership Rules,
COMMON L. BLOG (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.commlawblog.com/2012/04/articles/
broadcast/fcc-seeks-further-input-on-foreign-ownership-rules.
85.
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
§ 208(a), § 310, 88 Stat. 1263, 1281-82 (1974).
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below.8 6 And in 1989, the FEC took the position that "a foreign
national with control or ownership of a domestic subsidiary could not
make decisions with regard to that subsidiary's participation in the
U.S. political process. This quickly developed into the regulatory
loophole for foreign-controlled
and foreign-owned domestic
corporations that Congress and the courts find themselves
confronting today."87
Despite these limitations, U.S. law does permit some foreign
influence. Under FARA, foreign lobbyists may spend limitlessly,
directly lobbying elected officials.88 Foreign nationals may make "in
kind" contributions of volunteer services to candidates "even if the
value of those services is significantly greater than the legal limit for
monetary contributions."8 9 For instance, Elton John, a Brit, helped
raise $2.5 million dollars when he performed at a 2008 Hillary
Clinton presidential campaign event.90 Foreign-owned press, such as
The Economist, may advocate via editorials for particular candidates
in U.S. elections. 9 ' These examples of foreign actors engaging in the
U.S. political system do not represent new phenomena; their
participation has long been accepted as political speech. 9 2
3.

Legislation Regulating
Contributions

Foreign-Linked

Corporate

Political

Congress's most recent, major campaign-finance legislation,
BCRA, was at the center of the Citizens United case.93 Among other

86.
See Savarin, supra note 53, at 793-94 (discussing the FEC's role in
administering the Bentsen Amendment); infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Bentsen
Amendment).
87.
Vega, supra note 9, at 973-74 (citation omitted).
88.
Paul Sherman, IJ Files Brief in Important Follow-Up to Citizens United,
CONGRESS
SHALL MAKE No
LAw (Oct. 5,
2011,
10:14
AM),
http://
http://makenolaw.org/component/content/article/5/224-ij-files-brief-in-important-followup-to-citizens-united.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
"Foreign-owned magazines and newspapers-like the British-owned weekly
magazine, The Economist, which has a U.S. circulation of over 760,000-routinely
advocate the defeat or election of American political candidates through editorial
endorsements." Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 7
(2012) (noting that the "bombshell question" in Citizens United was, in part,
determining whether "the Court [should] overrule ... the part of McConnell v. Federal
Election Comm'n, which addresses the facial validity of Section 203 [of BCRA]"
(citation omitted)). Michael S. Kang has explained the interest surrounding the
campaign-finance legislation:
The restrictions on corporate electioneering in BCRA were, after all, supported
by a number of large corporations, including General Motors, Ford Motors,
Monsanto, Time Warner, Dell, Cisco, and IBM. The legal ability of corporations
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reforms,
BCRA
added
the
category
of
"electioneering
communications" to the political communications covered under the
FECA. The § 441b prohibition against use of treasury funds to make
independent expenditures to finance electioneering communications
was struck down in Citizens United.94 More germane to this Note,
BCRA reaffirmed and expanded the ban on contributions and
independent expenditures from foreign sources.9 5
Passed in 1974, the Bentsen Amendment to FECA prohibited
"foreign nationals from making contributions or expenditures in
connection with any United States election (federal, state or local),
either directly or through another person."9 6 FECA defines foreign
national to include foreign corporations but not domestic
subsidiaries.9 7 The Bentsen Amendment does not bar permanent
resident aliens from making electoral contributions.9 8
Under current law, domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations
may make state-level contributions to campaigns so long as the
foreign parent or owner does not finance the political speech.9 9

to spend politically in support of legislators opens the door to a form of
extortion against deep-pocket corporations by those very same legislators.
Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
94.
See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010)
(noting that "BCRA § 203 amended [2 U.S.C.] § 441b to prohibit any 'electioneering
communication' as well" before invalidating BCRA § 203).
95.
See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 303, 116 Stat.
81, 96 (2002) (codified in sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47
U.S.C.) (amending FECA § 319 to strengthen the foreign-money ban). Some have even
gone as far as to argue for striking down the ban on foreign independent expenditures
as they "constitute a far more transparent channel of influence than the status quo of
lobbying" and using PACs. James lanelli, Noncitizens and Citizens United, 56 LoY. L.
REV. 869, 873 (2010).
96.
Federal and State Campaign Finance Laws, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/
pages/brochures/statefed.shtml (Oct. 1995) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441e; 11 C.F.R. § 110.20
(2011)).
97.
See id. (including foreign corporations under the definition of foreign
national, while discussing domestic subsidiaries of a foreign corporation separately);
see also, e.g., Matthew Mosk, Foreign Company Admits Illegal Cash Donations to U.S.
State Campaigns, ABC NEWS (July 1, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/foreigncompany-admits-illegal-cash-donations-us-statestory?id=13979521#.TsR8DlafnKc
(discussing penalties levied against Invista S.A.R.L., a chemical company registered in
Luxembourg but headquartered in Kansas, for making illegal political contributions).
98.
See 2 U.S.C. § 441e(b) (defining foreign national so as to include "an
individual who is not a citizen of the United States or a national of the United
States . . . and who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . .").
99.
'"These domestic subsidiaries have contributed to federal candidates
through political action committees (PACs) for decades and have made direct corporate
contributions and expenditures in the 28 states that allow corporate funding of
elections." Kenneth A. Gross, Alito Was Right, FOREIGN POL'Y (Feb. 2, 2010),
http://www.foreignpolicy.comi/articles/2010/02/02/alito was right?print=yes&hidecomm
ents-yes&page=full. Long before the Citizens United decision, the FEC interpreted
§ 441e to require a domestic subsidiary to demonstrate that it has adequate funds in its
account-not the parent corporation's account-to make corporate donations in state
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Regarding federal contributions, domestic subsidiaries of foreign
corporations may not establish a federal PAC if the "foreign parent
corporation finances the PAC's establishment, administration, or
solicitation costs; or [i]ndividual foreign nationals" participate in the
operation of the PAC's operation or in decision making regarding
contributions or expenditures. 100 One former FEC Commissioner
contended that top corporate management "always" controls a
PAC.10 The Commissioner rejected the concept that foreign nationals
have no influence over the domestic subsidiary's PAC's activities.102
Even so, the prohibition on such entanglement would likely result in
severe penalties in the court of public opinion as well as a damaging
enforcement action brought by the FEC.
Following BCRA, the FEC considered whether to interpret BCRA
as prohibiting domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations "from
making donations in connection with State and local elections." 03

and local elections. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n Advisory Opinion No. 1989-20 (Oct.
27, 1989) (noting that a domestic subsidiary of a Japanese parent corporation could not
establish a PAC because the domestic subsidiary was primarily funded by the parent
corporation). One example of a subsidiary of a foreign corporation unlawfully
influencing the electoral system follows:
[Itinere North America, LLC] was formed under Maryland law and develops
proposals for road concession projects in the United States. It made a total of
$55,500 in contributions to Virginia candidates and committees between June
2007 and January 2008. As a domestic entity, the campaign finance issue arose
because the LLC used funds that came from its ultimate Spanish parent
through its immediate Maryland parent to make these contributions. The LLC
did not use revenues generated from U.S. operations that had been properly
segregated. Thus, the LLC indirectly used foreign funds for such contributions.
Carol A. Laham & D. Mark Renaud, Domestic Subsidiary of Foreign CorporationPays
Fine for State Candidate Contributions, ELECTION LAW NEWS (Sept. 2009),
The FEC
www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles&newsletter=8&id=5506.
ultimately imposed a small civil penalty since the company self-reported the violation.
See id. For another example, see Conciliation Agreement, In re Transurban Group,
MUR 6093 (Fed. Election Comm'n 2009), available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/
eqsdocsMUR/29044224176.pdf (imposing a civil penalty against a domestic subsidiary
for violating §441e in making political contributions using funds that were provided by
its foreign parent corporation).
100.
Foreign Nationals, FED.
ELECTION
COMMISSION
(July
2003),
(citing 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(i)
http://www.fec.gov/pagesfbrochures/foreign.shtml#ftn1
(2011)); see also Fed. Election Comm'n Advisory Opinion 2000-17 (July 28, 2000)
(providing the FEC's interpretation of many of the laws that apply to the formation and
governance of PACs by domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations).
101.

MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, BUYING INTO AMERICA: How FOREIGN

MONEY IS CHANGING THE FACE OF OUR NATION 19 (1988) (quoting Thomas E. Harris,
Fed. Election Comm'n Comm'r).
Id.
102.
Fed. Election Comm'n Advisory Opinion 2006-15, at 2-3 (May 19, 2006)
103.
(addressing the question of whether a particular domestic subsidiary of a foreign
parent corporation may "make donations and disbursements of corporate funds in
connection with State and local elections, to the extent permitted by State and local
law, from funds generated by their U.S. operations").
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The FEC Office of the General Counsel provided its legal opinion that
"BCRA does not mandate a rule-making regarding U.S.
subsidiaries." 10 4 Nonetheless, on August 22, 2002, the FEC issued a
NPRM; the proposed regulation sought to eliminate all federal PACs
established by domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations.10 5
In response to the FEC proposal, Bridgestone/Firestone, a wholly
owned U.S. subsidiary of Bridgestone Corporation, a Japanese entity,
and other domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations such as
DaimlerChrysler North America Holding Corporation and Philips
Electronics North America Corporation submitted comments. 106
Finding
the
NPRM
"unwarranted
and
unreasonable,"
Bridgestone/Firestone
outlined
several
arguments. 107
First,
Bridgestone/Firestone argued that Congress made no change in
BCRA to the "existing statutory exception permitting foreign
corporations' domestic subsidiaries to make contributions in state and
local elections, to establish a PAC, and to guarantee the 'restricted
class' American' employees an equal opportunity to voice their
political views by contributing to the company's PAC."10 8
Bridgestone/Firestone further argued that there is "no reasonable
public policy rationale for overthrowing longstanding agency
policy."10 9 Finally, Bridgestone/Firestone maintained that defining
which companies are foreign "controlled" is impracticable.' 10 These
arguments preview the underpinnings for treating domestic
subsidiaries equal to other U.S. corporations, which this Note
presents in Part IV.
Ultimately, the FEC found no congressional intent"' to broaden
the prohibition on foreign involvement to include U.S. subsidiaries of

104.
Memorandum from the Office of the Gen. Counsel on the Draft Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on Contribution Limitations and Prohibitions to the Fed.
Election Comm'n 31 (Aug. 13, 2002), available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/
agendas2002/mtgdocO2-57.pdf.
105.
See 67 Fed. Reg. 54,366, 54,372 (Aug. 22, 2002) ("[Tlhe Commission seeks
comment on whether BCRA's new statutory language prohibits foreign controlled U.S.
corporations, including a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation, from making
corporate donations, or from making federal contributions from their PACs, or both.").
106.
See, e.g., Letter from Steven J. Akey, Vice President, Bridgestone/Firestone
Americas Holding, Inc., to Mai T. Dinh, Fed. Election Comm'n (Sept. 13, 2002), available
at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/contributionlim-pro/bridgestone.pdf.
See generally
Contribution Limitations and Prohibitions, Comments on This Rulemaking, FED.
ELECTION COMM'N, http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/contribution_1im-pro/comments.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2012) (listing all of the comments the FEC received on the NPRM).
107.
Letter from Steven J. Akey to Mai T. Dinh, supra note 106, at 4.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
110.
Id. at 4-5.
111.
See Letter from John McCain and Russell D. Feingold, U.S. Senators, and
Christopher Shays and Marty Meehan, Members of Congress, http://www.fec.gov/
pdf/nprm/contributionlim-pro/mccain.pdf. Key co-sponsors of BCRA noted: "The issue
of whether foreign-controlled U.S. corporations should be barred from making non-
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foreign corporations.112 In fact, the FEC has long deemed three
factors paramount-the first two of which determine the FARA
foreign principal definition: where the corporation was chartered, its
principal place of business, and whether foreign nationals were
3
solicited for contributions to the corporate PAC.11 The FEC
continues to examine these factors when determining whether a
corporation with foreign ties may make independent expenditures
supporting political campaigns." 4 The FEC's finding, to narrowly
read BCRA and avoid regulation of domestic subsidiaries,
corresponds to its longstanding viewpoint of who constitutes a foreign
national.
4.

Domestic Subsidiaries, as Discussed in Citizens United

After Citizens United, "foreign corporations' American
subsidiaries may make unlimited independent expenditures" and run
PACs.1 1 5 Before Justice Stevens' reference to foreign-controlled
corporations having equal political-speech rights to those of
6
individual Americans in the dissenting opinion,1 the Justices
considered this possibility during the Citizens United oral
arguments." 7 Justice Ginsburg pressed the counsel for Citizens
United, former U.S. Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson, on whether
18
Congress could limit spending by multinational corporations.' In
response, Olson noted the constitutionality of imposing campaignfinance limits on foreign-controlled corporations would depend on
federal donations of corporate treasury funds in states that permit such donations, or
establishing a federal political action committee, is a controversial one that would have
been addressed explicitly had BCRA intended to address it." Id.
See Fed. Election Comm'n Advisory Opinion 2006-15, at 3 ("When
112.
promulgating the Final Rules [to implement BCRA], the Commission indicated that it
found no evidence of Congressional intent to broaden the prohibition on foreign
national involvement in U.S. elections to cover U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
corporations.").
See generally Savarin, supra note 53, at 801-05 (discussing the FEC's
113.
method for determining when a corporation is considered a foreign national under
FE CA).
See 22 U.S.C. § 611(b) (2006) (defining foreign principal to include a
114.
corporation that is "organized under the laws of or having its principal place of
business in a foreign country"); see also 11 C.F.R. 110.20 (2011) (defining foreign
national to include a "foreign principal, as defined in 22 U.S.C. 611(b)," and requiring
that "[n]o person shall knowingly solicit, accept, or receive from a foreign national any
contribution or donation").
Vega, supra note 9, at 977 (citations omitted).
115.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010)
116.
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority opinion
for, among other things, relying on the idea that "corporations must be treated
identically to natural persons in the political sphere").
Transcript of Oral Argument, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130
117.
S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205).
Id. at 5.
118.
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whether the government "established a compelling governmental
interest and a narrowly tailored remedy to that interest." 1 9 Then,
Justice Scalia asked whether Congress could prevent foreign
individuals from funding political speech. 120 Scalia presented the
presumed constitutionality of preventing foreign nationals from
engaging in political speech as an open question. This Note focuses
more narrowly on domestic subsidiaries, yet arguments for equalizing
foreign nationals' speech only buttress limited restrictions on
domestic subsidiaries.
C. Lower Court Decisions Since Citizens United
Since Citizens United, the courts have again addressed corporate
political speech, including foreign-national speech. 12 1 These decisions
may provide insight into how to analyze a domestic subsidiary's
speech. In Bluman v. Federal Election Commission, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia granted the FEC's motion to
dismiss a complaint challenging the constitutionality of the statute
prohibiting contributions and expenditures by foreign nationals. 2 2
The plaintiffs, who were resident aliens, attacked the supposedly less
controversial government regulation of purely foreign individuals and
corporations.1 23 In dismissing the suit, the court relied on the
principle that foreign nationals do not have a constitutional right to
participate in activities of democratic self-governance within the
United States.124 Deeming the government to have a compelling
interest in limiting such participation, the court found that political
contributions and express-advocacy expenditures constitute part of
the process of democratic self-government. 125 Of particular interest,
the court noted that foreign countries also distinguish between
citizens and noncitizens in the campaign-finance arena: "[I]t is part of
a common international understanding of the meaning of sovereignty

119.
Id.
120.
Id. at 6.
121.
For examples of cases addressing corporate political speech and foreignnational speech, see Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 2011); Bluman v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 132 S.Ct. 1087
(2012); United States v. Danielczyk, 788 F. Supp. 2d 472, 481 (E.D. Va.), opinion
clarified on denial of reconsideration,791 F. Supp. 2d 513 (E.D. Va. 2011), rev'd, 683
F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012), rev'd, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012); Minn. Citizens Concerned
for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (D. Minn. 2010), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012); Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, No.
2:09-cv-188, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86175, at *17 (D. Vt. June 21, 2012).
122.
Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 283, 292. Foreign nationals who make
independent expenditures tied to a federal election commit a felony under 2 U.S.C.
§ 441e(a)(1)(C). Ianelli, supra note 95, at 870.
123.
See Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 283.
124.
Id. at 288.
125.
Id.
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and shared concern about foreign influence over elections."' 2 6
Without further comment, the Supreme Court upheld the lower
court's ruling.127

Though the Bluman decision seemingly shut the door on
challenges to foreign nationals' contributions, the domestic
subsidiaries question was again left untouched. The Bluman opinion,
however, poses dangerous implications for foreign-linked U.S.
corporations. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellants argued
against a constriction of their political speech based on an erroneous
notion of their having "less than full-fledged First Amendment
rights."128 The outcome in Bluman certainly begets a minimized
panoply of rights. The reasoning underlying the decision-a
restriction on foreign participation in democratic self-governmentemploys an overly broad concept of self-government. As the
appellants asserted, "[Campaign advocacy] is participation in political
dialogue, to be sure, but not in self-government. Only if Americans
find [the] views convincing will those citizens choose to govern
themselves accordingly." 2 9 Moreover, in other First Amendment
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has found that "the fear that
speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting it."' 3 0
The Bluman court's reliance on influence from foreign-linked
political speech implies that foreign-linked corporate speech could
face the same fate if challenged in court. But as the appellants in
Bluman noted, the government did not cite-and could not cite-"any
case recognizing an interest in 'influence prevention' as even
legitimate, much less compelling" as demanded under the strict
scrutiny test.13' Turning to protection of sovereignty as a justification
for limiting foreign-linked political speech, Bluman's rationale would
seem to offer opponents of foreign-linked corporate speech an avenue
through which to challenge the current status of the law.

126.
Id. at 292.
See Kenneth P. Doyle, Ban on Foreign Money in U.S. Campaigns Upheld by
127.
Supreme Court in Summary Order, BLOOMBERGBNA MONEY & POLITICS REP., Jan. 10,
2012 (commenting on the Bluman decision that, "The Supreme Court without further
comment .. . upheld a federal law against foreigners' providing money in U.S. election
campaigns").
Opposition to Motion To Dismiss or Affirm at 5, Bluman v. Fed. Election
128.
Comm'n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 11-275).
129.
Id. at 6.
130.
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011) (citing
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)).
Opposition to Motion To Dismiss or Affirm supra note 128, at 9.
131.
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III. CORPORATE POLITICAL-SPEECH REGULATIONS AND
JURISPRUDENCE FROM BUCKLEY TO
CITIZENS UNITED

The Supreme Court has wrestled with regulations on corporate
political speech, demonstrating anything but a linear jurisprudence.
Since Buckley, the Supreme Court "has been the preeminent force in
shaping and constraining our campaign finance laws." 132 Prior to
Citizens United, the Court had relied upon three main rationales in
supporting the Government's interest in restricting corporate political
speech: anticorruption, antidistortion, and shareholder protection.1 33
The Citizens United decision represents a shift in the Court's
corporate political- speech jurisprudence: the decision overturned

Austin v. Michican State Chamber of Commerce and partially
overturned McConnell, which relied on the antidistortion rationale
and the anticorruption rationale respectively.1 3 4 Because such
reasoning may hold greater weight in the context of foreign-connected
U.S. corporations, Part III reviews the evolution of corporate
campaign-finance jurisprudence.

A. Beginning with Buckley
The Supreme Court in Buckley evaluated the 1974 amendments
to FECA, a comprehensive statute enacted in 1971 and aimed at
resolving campaign-finance concerns.135 FECA required full reporting
of campaign contributions and expenditures and provided a
framework for PACs established by corporations and unions.136 While
FECA banned direct contributions from corporate treasuries, the
statute permitted SSFs. 3 7 FECA and its implementing regulations
permitted these corporate PACs "to solicit voluntary contributions
from those most intimately associated with the firm and its interests:
executives, employees, shareholders, administrative personnel, and
the immediate families of those constituencies."s38 Addressing several
FECA provisions in Buckley, the Court upheld individual contribution
limits since they "serve the basic governmental interest in
safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly

132.
Briffault, supra note 39, at 887.
133.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 961 (2010).
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 154 (2003).
134.
135.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (describing the 1974
amendments). The key amendment at issue, known as the Bentsen Amendment, 2
U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2006), aimed to prohibit "all foreign nationals, with the exception of
resident aliens, from making any contributions in U.S. elections." Savarin, supra note
53, at 793.
136.
2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006).
137.
Id. at 197.
138.
Winkler, supra note 38, at 934.
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impinging upon the rights of individual citizens and candidates to
engage in political debate and discussion."' 39 In its discussion of
contribution limits, the Court identified FECA's primary purpose as
preventing "actual and apparent corruption of the political process";
an interest justifying restrictions on political speech. 140 And although
it upheld individual-contribution limits, the Court struck down the
independent-expenditure ceilings, limitations on a candidate's
expenditures from his own personal funds, and ceilings on overall
campaign expenditures, finding the provisions to overly burden
protected political expression.141
Deeming independent-expenditure ceilings to "impose direct and
substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech," the Court
found "the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption" inadequate to justify the restrictions.142
Rejecting "equalizing the relative ability" of groups to influence
elections as an adequate governmental interest, the Court noted:
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment, which was designed "to secure 'the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,"' and 'to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
143
social changes desired by the people."'

Thus, from the beginning, the Court has curtailed restrictions on
political expression.
Regarding limits on candidates' expenditures from personal
resources, the Court found the governmental interest in "equalizing
the relative financial resources of candidates competing for elective
office" insufficient to support the infringement of an individual's First
Amendment rights.144 And, finally, in rejecting the overall campaignexpenditures limitations, the Court noted: "The First Amendment
denies government the power to determine that spending to promote
one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise." 145
B. After Bellotti: Supreme Court Upholds CorporatePolitical-Speech
Regulations
Whether the First Amendment political-speech protection
applies differently to corporations, as opposed to individuals, was first

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
(1964)).
144.
145.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58.
Id. at 53.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39, 45.
Id. at 48-49 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269
Id. at 54.
Id. at 57.
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addressed in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.146 Banks and
corporations challenged a Massachusetts statute prohibiting them
from making certain expenditures aimed at influencing referenda.147
The Supreme Court held the statute was unconstitutional, finding
constitutional protections of corporate speech no different than
constitutional protections of "natural persons."148 Rejecting the lower
court's holding that the First Amendment only protects corporate
speech directly pertaining to the corporation's business interests, the
Bellotti majority noted: "If a legislature may direct business
corporations to 'stick to business,' it also may limit other
corporations-religious, charitable, or civic-to their respective
'business' when addressing the public. Such power in government to
channel the expression of views is unacceptable under the First
Amendment."149 Moreover, the Court found there was no compelling
state interest to justify prohibiting corporate speech.15 0
The Court did not outright reject the two main justifications
advanced for prohibiting corporate speech: (1) antidistortion, or "the
State's interest in sustaining the active role of the individual citizen
in the electoral process" and (2) shareholder protection, or "the
interest in protecting the rights of shareholders whose views differ
Briefly
from those expressed" by corporate management.15
mentioning these rationales, the Court found these interests
inapplicable in the context of the referenda at issue. 5 2 The Court
recognized the First Amendment's role in "affording the public access
to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and
ideas." 53
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence continued to
distinguish between corporate and other speakers. In Federal

Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee, the
Supreme Court "unanimously concluded that the economic
advantages provided by the corporate form gave corporations unique
power that justified special regulation of corporate campaign
activities."1 54 The Court embraced the antidistortion and shareholder
protection rationales. In Austin, the Supreme Court evaluated the
constitutionality of a Michigan statute that prohibited corporations
from using corporate treasure for independent expenditures-while

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978).
Id. at 769.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 787.
Id. at 787-88.
Id. at 783.

154.

William D. Araiza, Campaign Finance Regulation: The Resilience of the

American Model, 2 AMSTERDAM L.F. 55, 56 (2009).
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permitting PAC spending-in elections.' 55 Reversing the Sixth
Circuit, the Court held the statute was constitutional because there
was a compelling government interest and it was narrowly
tailored.156 The statute addressed the compelling state interest of
eliminating "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas." 5 7 The Court found it
narrowly tailored because the statute did "not impose an absolute ban
on all forms of corporate political spending but permits corporations
to make independent political expenditures" via PACs. 58
In Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, the ban on
corporate contributions was challenged as applied to nonprofit
advocacy corporations. 5 9 The Court held that a nonprofit advocacy
group was constitutionally prohibited from making direct
contributions despite the minimized potential for corruption and
distortion of the electoral system.160 Describing its campaign-financeregulation jurisprudence, the Supreme Court suggested that its
jurisprudence displays respect for the "legislative judgment that the
special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly
careful regulation."' 6 '
The Supreme Court began evaluating the constitutionality of
campaign-finance restrictions in BCRA in McConnell. In McConnell,
the Court considered several BCRA provisions.' 6 2 Of interest to this
Note, the Court upheld BCRA's restriction on corporations that
prohibited them from using corporate treasury funds to finance
"electioneering communications," or those broadcast, cable, or
satellite communications "aired just prior to elections that are
ostensibly about issues but obviously designed to help" particular
favored candidates.163
Thus, from Bellotti to Citizen's United, the Supreme Court
consistently upheld regulations of corporate campaign finance
designed to minimize corporate political speech. Clearly, corporate
electioneering possibilities expanded following Citizens United.

155.
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990).
156.
Id. at 652.
157.
Id. at 660.
158.
Id.
159.
539 U.S. 146, 150 (2003). For the ban on corporate contributions that was
challenged, see 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006).
160.
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003).
161.
Id. at 155 (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right To Work Comm., 459
U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982)); Austin, 494 U.S. at 661.
162.
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 94 (2003).
163.
Winkler, supra note 38, at 936.
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C. Shift to Deregulation

Shifting from tightly circumscribed limits on electioneering, the
Supreme Court has opened the electoral process to an era of
expanded sources of funds to support candidates and issues. Election
law professor Richard Hasen describes the "Manichean struggle over
the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation" as driven by a
"fundamental difference in worldviews," which has resulted in a
swinging pendulum of jurisprudence.164 The current Roberts Court
has moved away from deference to legislative efforts to regulate to
deregulation. 165
In Citizens United, a 5-4 majority struck down 2 U.S.C. § 441b,
which restricted corporate electoral spending.166 The Supreme Court
found, "Government may regulate corporate political speech through
disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that
speech altogether."167 Critics argue that the Court "could have
decided the corporate spending question in Citizens United without
revisiting the Austin and McConnell holdings allowing corporate
spending limits." 6 8
While the Court's holding was a departure from more recent
precedent, Congress only prohibited corporate independent
expenditures beginning in 1947.169 Even then, the Labor
Management Relations Act, which achieved the restriction, had to
surpass President Truman's veto. 170 This context underlines the
historically contentious nature of campaign finance and difficulty in
finding appropriate legal guideposts to resolve such questions.

IV. RATIONALES FOR TREATING U.S. SUBSIDIARIES THE
SAME AS OTHER U.S. CORPORATIONS

This Note focuses neither on voting nor policy outcomes but on
political speech, which surely affects the former. Nonetheless, the
premise adopted from the outset was that the U.S. democratic process
has the capacity to intake speech from corporate and individual
actors-rejecting any legal distinction between their respective
political speech. With disclosure and identification requirements

164.
Richard L. Hasen, What the Court Did-and Why, AM. INT., July/Aug. 2010,
www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=853.
165.
Id.
166.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
167.
Id.
168.
Hasen, supra note 164.
169.
Direct contributions were first banned in 1907. See infra note 40 and
accompanying text.
170.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 953.
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regulating corporate political speech, treating corporate actors
differently based on their foreign connections serves little purpose
beyond political rhetoric. Policy considerations, including the
company's ability to express its views on regulatory demands,
taxation, and other issues that may impact its U.S. citizen employees,
and the U.S. government's interest in attracting foreign investment,
support an expansive view of corporate political speech. This Part
presents the rationale for permitting a full corporate political-speech
arsenal for foreign-linked domestic corporations.
A. Speech Is Valuable in and of Itself
This Note adopts the theory that speech is valuable in and of
itself-not because it reflects the preexisting views of the
electorate.171 The Alexander Meiklejohn theory of the First
Amendment posits that speech's purpose is "to give to every voting
member of the body politic the fullest possible participation in the
understanding of those problems with which the citizens of a selfgoverning society must deal."' 7 2 According to Meiklejohn, the First
Amendment provides that "no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no
counterbelief, no relevant information, may be kept from them." 7
The Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence on corporate
political speech "does not take the truth or falsity of the
communication into account." 1 74
The Supreme Court has faced tension between two competing
theories: an absolute amount of speech and a relative allocation of
speech. Following the absolute allocation approach, "If one believes
that political speech in itself is a good thing, regardless of its source
and its relative allocation, then one should not be concerned if speech
comes in unequal amounts from proponents of different views."175
Under the "absolute" theory, speech from "non-members of the polity,
such as foreigners and non-natural entities such as corporations" does
not cause concern. 176 The relative allocation theory, on the other
hand, views speech as "valuable because it reflects, in rough
proportions, the pre-existing . .. views of the electorate" and aims for

See Araiza, supra note 154, at 55 (describing the Supreme Court's "growing
171.
skepticism about the argument that corporate political speech risks corrupting the
political process by skewing debate").
172.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 88 (Lawbook Exchange 2000) (1948).
Id. at 88-89.
173.
Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an
174.
Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 616
(2006) (emphasis added).
175.
Araiza, supra note 154, at 59.
176.
Id.
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such an allocation of speech.17 7 Dating to Bellotti, the Court has
rejected a paternalistic approach to the First Amendment and
recognized "that people are ordinarily the best judges of their own
interests."1 78
In the realm of candidate spending limits, 5-4 majorities of the
Supreme Court struck down laws that imposed burdens on
candidates' political speech in Davis v. Federal Election Commission

and Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett. 79
In Davis, the Supreme Court addressed a First Amendment challenge
to a BCRA provision known as the "Millionaire's Amendment," 8 0
which, in response to "self-financing" candidates,' 8 ' permits "non-selffinancing" candidates to receive individual contributions at triple the
"normal limit (e.g., $6,900 rather than the current $2,300), even from
individuals who have reached the normal aggregate contributions
cap, and may accept coordinated party expenditures without limit."182
The Supreme Court found a "substantial burden on the exercise of the
First Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech,"
and concluded that the Government had failed to advance any
compelling interest that would justify such a burden. 8 3
Finding an even greater burden on speech in Arizona Free
Enterprise, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a
provision in the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act that provided
publicly financed state office candidate matching funds to those of
privately financed candidates.184 The matching funding was
dependent on and in "direct response to the political speech of
privately financed candidates and independent expenditure
groups." 8 5 The provision imposed a substantial burden on privately
financed candidates and independent- expenditure groups' political
speech. 86 The Supreme Court held that the State of Arizona's
matching-funds scheme lacked any compelling interest in equalizing
electoral funding among publicly financed and privately financed

177.
Id.
178.
First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978); Daniel A.
Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105
HARV. L. REV. 554, 558 (1991).
179.
Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806,
2812 (2011); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 726 (2008).
180.
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 319, 116 Stat. 81,
109-12 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a)).
181.
Self-financing candidate refers to a wealthy candidate who spends in
excess of a specified threshold of personal funds. Davis v. FEC, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR.,
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=
120%3Adavis-v-fec&catid=27&Itemid=54 (last updated Oct. 19, 2010).
182.
Davis, 554 U.S. at 729.
183.
Id. at 740.
184.
Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2813-14.
185.
Id. at 2824.
186.
Id. at 2820-21.
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candidates. 8 7 The Court found that the "level the playing field"
interest, as well as the anticorruption interest, does not justify the
1 88
matching funds provision under First Amendment scrutiny.
Describing the matching-funds provision's approach, the Supreme
Court quoted the Buckley opinion for the notion that "restrict[ing] the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others" is "wholly foreign to the First
Amendment."1 89 Brushing aside the State of Arizona's attempt at
fairness, the Supreme Court stated that the "guiding principle" under
the First Amendment vis-A-vis campaign speech is the "unfettered
interchange of ideas."1 so
From Alexis de Tocqueville to modern scholars, observers have
described the United States as "the interest group society."191 And if
lawmaking often results from "bargains between politically
influential interest groups and government officials," the extent to
which domestic subsidiaries may engage in the negotiation
matters.192 Unlike other countries, the United States has not focused
19 3
on allocating speech in proportion to the support it enjoys.
Canadian political parties, for instance, receive broadcast time in
94
proportion to their electoral popularity.1 The United States' lengthy
electoral process intentionally puts candidates through the wringer to
ferret out the strong from the weak, minimizing the need for
proportionality. Behind this approach is implicitly the notion that the
American electorate, when exposed to more political speech, will
parse through the political spin and determine who would best
represent them. If the quantity of speech were allocated according to
popularity at any given time, the engagement of an electorate facing
political speech from diverse sources-with divergent opinions on the
issues-would dwindle, obfuscating the need for the country's lengthy
campaigns. Moreover, if the electorate could not separate sourcesthe candidates' messages from those of PACs or even the foreign

187.
Id. at 2825-27.
188.
Id.
Id. at 2821 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)).
189.
Id. at 2826 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14).
190.
See James M. Lindsay, Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of
191.
Executive-Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 530, 536
(2003) (quoting JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY (2d ed. 1989)).
Adam Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, 108 MICH. L. REV. 153, 161 (2009).
192.
By "negotiation," this Note refers to the competition among interests presenting
differing policy visions and candidates.
See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)
193.
("[The First Amendment] presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative
selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our
all.").
Araiza, supra note 154, at 59.
194.
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press-how could one expect them to evaluate the substance of
political positions?
Preventing American subsidiaries of foreign corporations from
making campaign contributions is "antithetical to the First
Amendment," for "the people in our democracy are entrusted with the
responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of
conflicting arguments." 195 Voters surely may consider "the source and
credibility of the advocate. But if there be any danger that the people
cannot evaluate the information and argument ... it is a danger
contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment." 9 6

B. Freedom-of-the-PressJurisprudenceSupports
Domestic Subsidiaries'Corporate
PoliticalSpeech
One lens through which to view corporate political speech draws
upon another First Amendment guarantee: freedom of the press.
Since scholars conflate the freedom of speech and press clauses,
exploring the Supreme Court's line of jurisprudence in that arena
makes sense.19 7 The "access cases" required the Supreme Court "to
decide in effect whether the Government has an affirmative role,
under the First Amendment, in securing a balanced ideological
marketplace .

.

. the Court established that the Government cannot

decide the limits of fairness in American journalism." 9 8
One observer argued that Citizens United grants "press
freedoms-notably the right to electioneer in the days before federal
press
and
noninstitutional
elections-to
nonconventional
entities . . . ."199 Taking the press "in its historic connotation" as every
publication that "affords a vehicle of information and opinion,"
increasing the availability of information-even from nontraditional
sources-seems valuable. 200 Rather than view Citizens United as

195.
Note, "Foreign"Campaign Contributions and the First Amendment, 110
HARv. L. REV. 1886, 1894 (1996) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.

765, 791-92 (1978)).
196.
Id. at 1895 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791-92). Because the United States
was a nation of immigrants in the 1780s, the Founders did not address the issue of who
was a foreigner.
197.
See generally Anthony L. Fargo & Laurence B. Alexander, Testing the
Boundaries of the First Amendment Press Clause: A Proposalfor Protecting the Media
from Newsgathering Torts, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1093 (2009) (providing a
comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the field of First
Amendment speech and press law).
198.
David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 80-81
(1975) (citing Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) and CBS v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)).
199.
Seth Korman, Citizens United and the Press: Two Distinct Implications, 37
RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 2 (2010).
200.
Id. at 4 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972)).
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removing "all benefits specially conferred on the press," the focus
should shift to opening the media to citizen journalism that, by
default, does not aim to represent a balanced ideological
marketplace.2 01 This related First Amendment clause, the press
clause, may provide support for full rights for domestic subsidiaries.
The courts have rejected attempts to force the media to broadcast
balanced viewpoints. At one time, the FCC required broadcast
licensees to "operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable
opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance."202 Essentially, the so-called "fairness doctrine" required
"sufficient presentation of opposing views on controversial issues of
public importance."2 03 The paternalistic fairness doctrine was
eliminated in 1987 when the FCC rejected it.204 In the 1989 Syracuse
Peace Council v. Federal Communications Commission decision, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the abolishment, finding the
FCC decision "was neither arbitrary, capricious nor an abuse of
discretion."2 05 The FCC and court found the doctrine disserved the
public interest in "diverse sources of information and the
broadcaster's interest in free expression."206 These same interests
counsel against limiting domestic subsidiaries' political speech.
Presuming a discerning American electorate, distinguishing
between parent and subsidiary corporations' messages should not be
problematic. Moreover, the law ought not to presume a subsidiary
liable for its parent corporation's actions or policies, and indeed the
law does not. The FCPA, which prohibits U.S. companies from paying
bribes to foreign governments to obtain business or to secure an
improper advantage, 207 does "not necessarily" hold domestic
corporations liable for the acts of their foreign subsidiaries.2 0 8 Courts
generally recognize a "presumption of separateness" between a parent
corporation and its subsidiary. 209

201.
Id. at 6.
Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(4) (2006).
202.
Jerome A. Barron, In Defense of "Fairness":A First Amendment Rationale
203.
for Broadcasting's"Fairness"Doctrine, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 31, 31 (1965).
Syracuse Peace Council v. Federal Communications Commission, 867 F.2d
204.
654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 669.
205.
Id. at 659.
206.
DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
207.
TRANSACTIONS 421-22 (2d ed. 2010).
Matthew S. Queler, Wendy Wu & Bettina Chin, Foreign Corrupt Practices
208.
Act, in PROSKAUER ON INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION ch. 27 (2011),
available at http://www.proskauerguide.com/law-topics/27/I.
Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1988).
209.
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C. Treaty ObligationsDictate that Domestic Subsidiaries
Deserve Equal Treatment
Foreign policy has dictated reciprocal treaty protections for
foreign businesses operating in the United States. As such,
subsidiaries may assert parent corporations' treaty protections. 210 If
Congress elected to impose political-speech restrictions on domestic
subsidiaries, it would need to account for such treaty obligations
because federal statutes "ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains." 211 Bilateral
friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN) treaties "provide rules to
protect the citizens of one country, and their property and other
interests in the other country . .. 212 These treaties contain varying
levels of protection: guaranteeing foreign nationals the same
treatment accorded U.S. citizens, that they would be treated "as well
as the nationals of any other country," or that their "vital rights"
213
would be protected.
In some circumstances, U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations
obtain advantages over domestic corporations thanks to these
treaties. For instance, the 1953 Japan-U.S. FCN Treaty accords
"national treatment" and "most favored nation treatment" to
corporations in the respective countries. 214 In other words, "nationals
of one party are not to be discriminated against by the other
party."215 The treaty
has the effect of according nationals of one party engaging in business within
the territory of the other party the same treatment accorded nationals of the
other party. For example, an American subsidiary of a Japanese parent [like
Bridgestone/Firestone] is to have the same rights as any domestically owned
2 16
American corporation.

Federal courts have repeatedly permitted domestic subsidiaries to
invoke such treaty protections, permitting the employment of foreign
nationals even when antidiscrimination laws (on the basis of national
origin) like Title IV would otherwise have been violated. 217
For foreigners who merely avail themselves of the U.S. market,
the United States has consented to certain protections against

210.
Keith Sealing, Sex, Allies and BFOQS: The Case for Not Allowing Foreign
CorporationsTo Violate Title VII in the United States, 55 ME. L. REV. 89, 113 (2003).
211.
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
212.
Sealing, supranote 210, at 91.
213.
Id.
214.
Japan Friendship Commerce and Navigation Treaty, U.S.-Japan, art. IV,
Apr. 9, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063.
215.
United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
216.
Id. at 824.
217.
See, e.g., Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 391-94 (7th Cir. 1991)
(involving U.S. subsidiary of Japanese company); Schanfield v. Sojitz Corp. of Am., 663
F. Supp. 2d 305, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (same).
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discriminatory treatment. The national treatment principle,
incorporated into all three main World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreements, requires countries to treat foreigners and locals
equally-"at least after the foreign goods, [services, and intellectual
property] have entered the market."218 This WTO provision aims to
influence domestic policymaking, covering "explicitly discriminatory
internal measures" as well as "measures that indirectly have such
consequences." 219 However, sovereign states still may employ
legitimate, nonprotectionist regulations under the national treatment
principle. The national treatment principle and FCN treaties seek to
level the playing field for domestic and foreign companies. Those
benchmarks weaken the justification for curbing corporate political
speech based on a foreign link.

D. Policy ConsiderationsFavor IncludingDomestic
Subsidiaries Within the Realm of Permissible
CorporatePolitical-SpeechActors
Any congressional action to limit foreign-linked corporate speech
should account for policy concerns rather than gaining political points
for "restricting foreign influence." Actual and perceived regulatory
demands that companies encounter, along with taxation policy, can
help or hinder investment in the United States. As such, domestic
subsidiaries operating in the United States should have a voice to
explicate their views. Finally, U.S.-citizen employees deserve an
employer-centric avenue (i.e. corporate PAC) through which to
express political speech like their fellow citizens who work for 100
percent American-owned corporations.
1.

Satisfying Demands of the Regulatory State

Regulatory mandates impact all companies doing business in the
United States, including domestic subsidiaries. Corporations push
back against regulations
that they find cost-prohibitive,
impracticable, or otherwise unreasonable. 220 And when "the cost of

Principles of the Trading System: Trade Without Discrimination,WORLD
218.
(last
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm
visited Dec. 14, 2012).
Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Still Hazy After All These Years: The
219.
Interpretation of National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-Law on Tax
Discrimination,15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 40 (2004).
220.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a lobbying organization representing more
than three million businesses, states as one of its policy priorities Tor 2012: "Push back
against legislation and regulations that hinder business' ability to raise capital or
mitigate risk." U.S. Chamber Policy Prioritiesfor 2012: Capital Markets, Corporate
Governance,
and
Securities
Regulation,
U.S.
CHAMBER
COM.,
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/priorities/corporate-governance-capital-markets-and-
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regulation outweighs its perceived benefits[,] issuers and investors
can and do migrate to other markets."221 Though the restrictions on
political speech may or may not always weigh down the scale enough
to cause migration, this policy question undoubtedly remains a
concern of corporate decision makers.
Preventing precious foreign investors interested in establishing
domestic subsidiaries and U.S. corporations from leaving the country
likely requires minimized regulatory burdens. But the regulatory
system certainly weighs in favor of granting domestic subsidiaries,
like other U.S. corporations, full political-speech capabilities.
Darden Restaurants, a public company incorporated in Florida 222
and the parent company of Olive Garden, Red Lobster, and LongHorn
Steakhouse, faces the same "plate piled high with more and more
federal, state and local regulations" as McCain Foods USA, Inc., a
private company incorporated in Illinois and the subsidiary of a
Canadian company.22 3 Likewise, why should Toyota Motor North
America, Inc., a subsidiary of a Japanese corporation, have any less
political capital available (through SSFs) when faced with the
National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
regulations than Delaware-incorporated Ford Motor Company?224
Recent years have seen Toyota pay tens of millions in civil penalties
for failure to "comply with the requirements of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act for reporting safety defects" to
NHTSA. 225 Why should one corporation-and by extension, its
employees-lose one of the most powerful tools of advocacy, political
speech?
Economists have found that a country's tax and regulatory
system strongly affects the value of corporate equity. 226 For corporate
managers charged with maximizing shareholder value, accounting for

securities-regulation (last visited Dec. 14, 2012) (discussing Dodd-Frank and
environmental regulations, among others).
221.
ALAN R. PALMITER, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: SECURITIES REGULATION 7
(4th ed. 2008).
222.
Articles of Incorporation,DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC., http://www.darden.com/
corporate/articlesofinc.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
223.
Clarence Otis, Jr., What's Stopping Job Creation? Too Much Regulation,
CNN (Dec. 6, 2011, 1:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/06/opinion/otis-regulationsjob-creationlindex.html. See generally Food Products: Company Overview of McCain
Foods USA, Inc., BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/
research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapld=4206976 (last visited Oct. 19, 2012)
(providing a brief background of McCain Foods).
224.
F Stock Quote-Ford Motor Company, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/
symbol/f (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
225.
See Press Release, Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Toyota Motor
Corp. Will Pay $32.425 Million in Civil Penalties as Result of Two Department of
Transportation Investigations (Dec. 20, 2010), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/
PR/DOT-216-10 (announcing auto-recall-related penalties).
226.
Ellen R. McGrattan & Edward C. Prescott, Taxes, Regulations, and the
Value of U.S. and U.K. Corporations,72 REV. ECON. STUD. 767, 767 (2005).
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regulatory burdens when determining where to do business must
weigh heavily. Consequently, burdens on political speech, which
likely indicate a broader policy choice vis-a-vis foreign investors,
cannot sit well with corporate actors.
2.

Lack of Electoral Vote Should Not Result in Taxation Without
Representation

Even if the vocal opposition to Citizens United wanted to isolate
corporations to fend for themselves, politically speaking, American
227
Congressmen
representative democracy rejects this notion.
districts
their
in
based
corporations
represent
should
represent and
who
grandparents
Security-receiving
as much as they do the Social
the
have
yet
do
not
who
or
children
polls,
consistently show up at the
22 8
right to vote.
Like other U.S. corporations, foreign-owned U.S. corporations
pay taxes. Although loopholes exist, corporations remain taxable, and
their common refrain condemns the higher tax rates they must pay
vis-a-vis their foreign competitors. Corporations lobby to cut the 35
percent U.S. corporate tax rate, now one of the highest in the
world. 229 During the 2012 election season, OdysseyRe, a U.S.
subsidiary of a Canadian company, cited then-Republican
presidential nominee Mitt Romney's stance on tax policy as a key
reason for donating $1 million dollars to Restore Our Future, a super
PAC supporting Romney. 230 The OdysseyRe general counsel stated
that the subsidiary "operates at a significant disadvantage" vis-a-vis
23
competitors in "more favorable tax jurisdictions." 1
Those subject to taxes should have ample access to the political
process; the premise underlying this concept is that taxpayers should
have the "right to defend themselves against potentially unfair

See STEVEN S. SMITH, JASON M. ROBERTS & RYAN J. VANDER WIELEN, THE
227.
AMERICAN CONGRESS 64 (7th ed. 2011) ("Defenders of the ruling argue that the Court,
by expanding the number of players who can attempt to influence elections, has
created a more competitive political environment.").
See ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, How POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR
228.
POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 2 (2003) (stating that senior

citizens "are the Uber-citizens of the American polity, voting and making campaign
contributions at rates higher than those of any other age group").
See, e.g., Laura D'Andrea Tyson, The Merits of a Corporate Tax Overhaul,
229.
ECONOMIX (Mar. 9, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/themerits-of-a-corporate-tax-overhaul (discussing Obama plan); John D. McKinnon, More
Firms Enjoy Tax-Free Status, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/
(discussing pass-through
SB10001424052970203733504577026361246836488.html
taxation).
Michael Beckel, Connecticut Firm at Center of New 'Citizens United'
230.
Controversy, CONN. MIRROR (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.ctmirror.org/story/17658/
connecticut-firm-center-new-citizens-united-controversy.
231.

Id.
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government policies." 232 In fact, people-who indeed make the choices
for corporations-"appear to rebel against taxation without
commensurate government services." 233 In the domestic subsidiary
context, perhaps over-provision of government services, i.e.
regulation, causes a "rebellion" against taxation, or reductions in or
elimination of business in the United States. U.S. companies shift
operations overseas, reaping tax benefits, yet those choosing to keep
jobs and profits in the United States face "one of the highest tax rates
in the world." 234 U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations are subject
to "anti-deferral" provisions designed to prevent the shelter of income
in offshore entities. 235
The United States has the distinction as the only developed
country that has failed to reform its corporate tax code in the last
thirty years. 236 Until new legislation enters into force, the law ought
not to restrict the political rights of domestic subsidiaries of foreign
corporations that invest in the United States while "American"
corporations ship production and jobs overseas and even hide
corporate profits in foreign subsidiaries overseas. Despite tax
disadvantages,
"high-tax foreign jurisdictions often attract
multinationals for a host of nontax reasons, including access to
consumer, labor, and capital markets"; however, scores of studies
have shown that "taxes, among other factors, influence the foreign
location decisions of multinational firms."237
3.

Interest in Attracting Foreign Investment

The United States has a policy interest in attracting foreign
investment. 2 38 With globalization's rise, competition for foreign
investment has increased, and "[diomestic subsidiaries have a vested
interest" in fostering foreign investment in the United States,
advocating laws and regulations beneficial to international

232.
See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT To VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (rev. ed. 2009) (tracing the development of
right to vote arguments).
233.
Michael L. Ross, Does Taxation Lead to Representation?, 34 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 229, 247 (2004).
234.
Barack Obama, President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012), available
at http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/24/politics/sotu-transcript/index.html?hpt-hp-tl.
235.
Daniel Cassidy, Federal Taxation of International Transactions,in DOING
BUSINESS IN WASHINGTON STATE: A GUIDE FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT
83, 84 (Randy J. Aliment ed., 2010).
236.
Tyson, supra note 229.
237.
Scott D. Dyreng et al., Taxes and the Clustering of Foreign Subsidiaries
(working paper, 2011) (citation omitted).
238.
High corporate income taxes do the "most harm[ ]" to economic growth,
according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Asa
Johansson et al., Tax and Economic Growth 2 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev.,
Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No. 620, 2008).
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business. 239 Chief financial officers of U.S. subsidiaries of foreignbased companies cited the political environment as one of the most
important factors for the location of major investments, according to a
2011 survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers. 240
Favoring nationalistic concerns over a policy of boosting foreign
investment would likely threaten international relations. In
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., the Belgian government
sought to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of Belgian
shareholders in a Canadian company, Barcelona Traction, which had
subsidiaries in Spain. 241 The Spanish government's refusal to
authorize a transfer of foreign currency necessary for servicing
Barcelona Traction's bonds had resulted in the Spanish courts seizing
Barcelona Traction and the subsidiaries' assets, thus harming the
Belgian stockholders. 2 4 2 The ICJ rejected Belgium's claim, finding it
had no standing. 24 3 The ICJ "articulated a rule . . . that a corporation

is a national of the state in which it is incorporated for the purpose of
diplomatic protection." 244 While most states have accepted this "rule,"
most also require a "genuine link" between the espousing state and
the injured corporation. 245 This Note does not address potential
claims corporations would pursue against the United States in
international bodies; however, domestic subsidiaries of foreign
corporations meet both criteria. Political- speech protectionism clearly
conflicts with a policy to promote foreign investment in the form of
domestic subsidiaries in the United States.
4.

Interests of U.S.-Citizen Employees

Domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations employ 21 million
U.S. citizens directly or indirectly. 246 Although U.S. corporations seek

Evan C. Zoldan, Strangers in a Strange Land: Domestic Subsidiaries of
239.
Foreign Corporationsand the Ban on Political Contributionsfrom Foreign Sources, 34
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 573, 583 (2003) (citation omitted).
ORG. FOR INT'L INV., U.S. ECONOMY CONFIDENCE RATING: A SURVEY OF 100
240.
CFOs OF U.S. SUBSIDIARIES OF FOREIGN COMPANIES 3 (2011), available at
http://www.ofii.org/docs/OFII-CFOSurvey_201 1.pdf.
See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 6,
241.
T 2 (Feb. 5) (outlining the questions at issue).
10-11 (explaining the issuance of Barcelona Traction's
See id. at 7,
242.
bonds and why their service was discontinued).
See id. at 50, 101 (denying jus standi).
243.
Lawrence Jahoon Lee, Barcelona Traction in the 21st Century: Revisiting
244.
Its Customary and Policy Underpinnings 35 Years Later, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 237, 237
(2006).
See id. at 238 (introducing the argument that most states have required
245.
something more than the incorporation rule).
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INV. POLICY FORUM, TOP 10 OVERLOOKED
246.
FACTS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 3 (2012) (citing ORG. FOR INT'L INV., CHAIN
REACTION, GLOBAL INVESTMENT WORKS FOR AMERICA (2012)).
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some foreign workers when unable to fill positions domestically, most
employees are U.S. citizens. 24 7 The function of PACs in facilitating
collective political speech allows employees to band together to
promote their interests. 248 Unions organize to insure jobs for their
members; likewise, employees at domestic subsidiaries have an
interest in uniting to ensure the continued presence of their foreigncontrolled corporation in the United States. Americans' political
rights "should not be abridged because of where they work." 249 There
is no justification for allowing American employees of Ford or ExxonMobil to participate in a corporate PAC while excluding Americans
who work for Daimler-Chrylser or Shell Oil.250 Clearly, U.S.-citizen
employees have other avenues through which to raise their political
voices, but the convenience and psychological power of partaking in a
company-sponsored PAC should not be withheld based on an
arbitrary determination of their employer's status as foreign. 251

V.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE "FOREIGN INFLUENCE"

If Congress passes legislation affecting domestic subsidiaries'
political speech, the legislation would undoubtedly face legal
challenge from the Organization for International Investment, and its
member organizations, which are known for their vigilance in
contesting restrictions on domestic subsidiaries. 2 52 Opponents to
restriction on domestic subsidiaries' political speech may choose to

247.
See METRO. POLICY PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, THE SEARCH FOR SKILLS:
DEMAND FOR H-1B IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS 1 (2012),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/07/18-hlb-visas-laborimmigration#overview (summarizing the findings of a number of H-1B requests as a
proportion of the overall workforce).
248.
Letter from David W. Carroll, Vice President, Lafarge N. Am., to Mai Dinh,
Fed. Election Comm'n 2-3 (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/
contribution_1im-prollafarge.pdf.
249.
Letter from Randall B. Moorhead, Vice President, Philips Elec. N. Am.
Corp., to Mai T. Dinh, Fed. Election Comm'n 2 (Sept. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/contribution_1im-pro/philips.pdf.
250.
See id. (labeling this inability to participate in PACs as "absurd").
251.
The SEC has stated 20 percent as the minimum level of ownership
necessary for effective control of a corporation. Cf. In re Request for Declaratory Ruling
Concerning the Citizenship Requirements of Sections 310(b)(3) & (4) of the Commc'ns
Act of 1934, as Amended, 103 F.C.C. 2d 511, 515-16 (1985) (applying strictly the
requirements of the Communications Act of 1934 by disallowing more than 20 percent
foreign ownership of a licensee).
252.
See, e.g., Brief for Nat'l Foreign Trade Council et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Feb.
3, 2012); Brief for Org. for Int'l Inv. & Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfg., Inc. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (No.
09-1343); Brief for Nat'l Foreign Trade Council & Org. for Int'l Inv. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendant/Appellee, Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 644 F.3d 909 (9th
Cir. 2011) (No. 07-15386).
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base their argument on a constitutional distinction. The Constitution
trumps congressional prerogative and federal statutes, and perhaps
restricting foreign-related speech is a foreign policy matter within the
executive's domain. 253 Constitutional law scholar Edward Corwin
suggested the Constitution offers "an invitation to struggle for the
privilege of directing American foreign policy."254 The executive
branch has "consistently adhered to an 'executive primacy'
interpretation of the Constitution's allocation of power over foreign
affairs." 255 Ultimately, the argument that power over domestic
subsidiaries' political speech falls within the executive's domain
cannot square with the reasons for treating subsidiaries equally laid
out in Part IV.256 The tension amounts to whether attempts to inhibit
foreign participation in the electoral process require executive branch
action or congressional legislation. Moreover, would the Supreme
Court find the action constitutional?
Assuming proposals vis-A-vis foreign-controlled domestic
subsidiaries fall within the legislative domain, the substance of the
legislation must be evaluated, with special attention paid to the
considerations that Part IV outlines and the permissible legal
justifications that Part III discussed. Despite vociferous opposition to
Citizens United, Congress has yet to enact legislation to counteract
the perceived threat of foreign influence. 257 In the immediate
aftermath of the Supreme Court decision, U.S. representatives and
senators introduced a host of measures. The most widely supported,
the Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in
Elections Act (the DISCLOSE Act), proposed a series of amendments
to FECA to prohibit foreign influence in federal elections and
establish additional disclosure requirements.2 58 Specifically, the
DISCLOSE Act would have applied "the ban on contributions and
expenditures by foreign nationals to foreign-controlled domestic
corporations. "259 The disclosure components would require groups

253.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
254.
JOHN LEHMAN, MAKING WAR: THE 200-YEAR-OLD BATTLE BETWEEN
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OVER THE WAY AMERICA GOES TO WAR (1992) (quoting
Edwin Corwin), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/47796/gregory-ftreverton/making-war-the-200-year-old-battle-between-president-and-congres.
255.
H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An
Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 528 (1999).
256.
See supra Part IV (describing strong foreign-policy considerations and
impacts on domestic policy, over which Congress certainly has authority).
See generally Paul Blumenthal, Ron Wyden: Campaign Disclosure Reform
257.
Chances 'Greater Than Ever Before', HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2013, 5:20 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/11/ron-wyden-campaigndisclosure n 2663981.html (indicating an enhanced legislative will to tackle campaignfinance reform, which would likely include clarifying foreign-linked entities' status).
258.
H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010).
259.
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OFFICIAL SUMMARY: H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. § 102
(2010) (passed as amended June 24, 2010).
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spending $10,000 or more to report within twenty-four hours to the
FEC and disclose the identity of donors whose contributions exceeded
$10,000. While it passed the House of Representatives in 2010,
cloture blocked its progress in the Senate. 260 In early 2012, House
Democratic leadership announced its intention to reintroduce a
modified version of the DISCLOSE Act, stating it "really goes to the
heart of the matter of an opportunity society and reigniting the
American dream in a way that works for everybody." 261 The Senate
introduced a revised version of the DISCLOSE Act in July 2012, but
it again died due to a failed vote for cloture. 262 Though the Senate bill
did not include the controversial, aforementioned ban on foreigncontrolled domestic corporations' political speech, whether a newly
enacted piece of campaign finance legislation would do so remains at
issue. 263
Harsher in tone, but with the same proposed effect as the
original 2010 House version of the DISCLOSE Act, the America is for
Americans Act would have amended FECA's definition of "foreign
national" to include domestic corporations with one or more foreign
principals with direct or indirect ownership interests. 264 Similar to
the America is for Americans Act but with even greater restrictions,
the Prohibiting Foreign Influence in American Elections Act sought to
prohibit any "subsidiary of a foreign principal," as well as
corporations with one or more foreign principals from (a) serving on
the board of directors, (b) having a direct or indirect ownership
interest, or (c) directly or indirectly holding its debt. 265 Along the
same lines, the American Elections Act of 2010 also proposed
restrictions based upon foreign ownership and control of the
corporation. 266 Finally, the Ethics in Foreign Lobbying Act of 2013
seeks to amend FECA to prohibit PAC contributions "sponsored by
foreign-controlled corporations and associations" (at least 50-percent
owned by a non-U.S. citizen or foreign national).2 67 The 50-percent

260.
Michael A. Memoli, Disclose Act Fails To Advance in Senate, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2010, at 2.
261.
Sean Lengell, House Dems Say They'll Reintroduce Campaign FinanceBill,
WASH. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2012, 4:28 PM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/insidepolitics/2012/jan/26/house-dems-say-theyll-reintroduce-campaign-finance.
262.
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OFFICIAL SUMMARY: S. 3369, 112th Cong. (2012).
263.
See Sam Stein, Disclose Act: Super PAC Transparency Legislation To Be
Introduced by House Democrats, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2012, 5:06 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/25/disclose-act-super-pac-chris-vanhollen n 1232008.html.
264.
H.R. 4510, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).
265.
H.R. 4522, 111th Cong. (2010).
See S. 2959, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010) (defining foreign corporations that are
266.
prohibited from making political contributions).
267.
H.R. 195, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013).
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rule was considered in the early 1990s and received support from
seventy-three U.S. Senators at one time. 268
Instead of enlarging federal election law, Congress ought to
restrain from imposing requirements exclusive to domestic
subsidiaries of foreign corporations of any sort. To relieve the haze of
confusion, Congress should immediately pass a concurrent resolution
expressing the principle that domestic subsidiaries of foreign
corporations retain equal rights and responsibilities under the law as
other U.S. corporations. 269 Businesses exploring participation in the
new markets demand the order and stability that a "firmlyestablished legal infrastructure" provides.270
Ultimately, all of the proposed legislative enactments suffer a
prima facie flaw: they presume domestic subsidiaries of foreign
corporations dangerous to American democracy. To survive
constitutional challenge, the legislation would need to articulate a
compelling interest. Protecting the American psyche from perceived
threats would not qualify as a compelling governmental interest.
Those bringing forth proposals to roll back foreign-linked corporate
influence claim the measures are "justified by the compelling interest
of the United States both in preventing those with greater financial
resources from obtaining undue influence in the political arena at the
expense of the less economically powerful, and in protecting U.S.
sovereignty as well as the U.S. citizens' right to selfdetermination." 271 Evoking powerful ideals like self-determination
and sovereignty does not mean foreign-linked political speech indeed
threatens the fulfillment of those principles. After all, only natural
person, U.S. citizens may exercise the franchise in a private, coercionfree ballot box.
Even if Congress were able to develop a compelling reason to
restrict domestic subsidiaries' political speech, it would have
difficulty crafting a narrowly tailored measure. In the above
proposals, the specific provisions recklessly define foreign national
and arbitrarily demarcate foreign-controlled versus United Statescontrolled. At worst, the 50 percent threshold seems excessive. 2 72 If

Public Hearing on ProposedForeign National Regulations, FED. ELECTION
268.
COMM'N REC., Dec. 1990, at 2-3.
See generally Forms of Congressional Action, LIBR. CONGRESS,
269.
(last visited Oct. 21,
http://thomas.loc.govfhomellawsmade.bysec/formsofaction.html
2012) (describing the concurrent resolution's use "for expressing facts, principles,
opinions, and purposes of the two Houses").
270.
See Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma and Beyond:
Understanding the Wave of State Anti-Transnational Law Initiatives, 87 IND. L.J.
SuPP. 1, 13 (2011) (explaining the challenges presented to businesses by an uncertain
legal market).
271.
Savarin, supra note 53, at 817.
Cf. First Amendment and Campaign FinanceReform After Citizens United
272.
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of
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the Ethics in Foreign Lobbying Act of 2013 passes, for example,
corporations like Lafarge North America, which employs 16,400
people but is more than 50-percent owned by a French entity, 27 3
would be prohibited from making direct contributions and sponsoring
a PAC for its employees. Even the FCC's "statutory benchmark" in
licensing matters for determining whether foreign interests would
damage the "public interest" begins at 25 percent. 2 74 Drawing a line
as to when a domestic corporation has too great a foreign link
remains a questionable proposition.
Returning to the conversation surrounding rationales for
restricting
corporate
political
speech
(the
anticorruption,
antidistortion, and shareholder protection rationales), this Note has
established that the fear of actual corruption is unfounded.27 5 The
law continues to prohibit foreign nationals from making contributions
or pulling the strings of domestic subsidiaries. Moreover, the fear of
corruption of the political process, relied upon in Buckley, should have
minimal influence as the role of corporate political finance has
received great attention and cemented itself in the discerning voter's
mind as a factor in our political system. The antidistortion rationale,
highlighted in Austin, also ignores a key reality of electoral politics:
"No matter how loudly an idea is expressed, and no matter its initial
popularity, it lives or dies according to how many people ultimately
believe it. If corporate-funded expression convinces no one, then it
distorts nothing."276 Worrying about corporate speech correlating to
the public's standing opinion on an issue, as Austin suggested, seems

the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 91 (2010). In response to Representative
Jerrold Nadler's suggestion of a requirement that "no corporation with more than .. . 5
percent ownership of non-American citizens can use its corporate treasury" for political
speech, constitutional law professor Laurence Tribe stated his opinion that the
Supreme Court would likely uphold it.
273.
See Company Overview of Lafarge North America, Inc., BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 29, 2012, 4:25 PM), http://investing.businessweek.com/research/
stocks/private/snapshot.asp? privcapld=284956 (providing Lafarge's employment data
and company background); see also Lafarge Rejects Buyout Offer from French Parent,
WICHITA Bus. J. (Mar. 24, 2006, 2:58 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/wichita/stories/
2006/03/20/daily27.html (detailing an attempt by Lafarge's parent company to acquire
the 47 percent of Lafarge North America that it did not own).
274.
FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES FOR FCC
COMMON CARRIER AND AERONAUTICAL RADIO LICENSES 6-7 (2004), available at

http://transition.fcc.gov/ib/ForeignOwnershipGuidelinesErratum.pdf.
275.
Cf. Stephen Dinan, Justice Says Supreme Court Should Revisit Campaign
Finance, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/
feb/1 7/justice-says-supreme-court-should-revisit-campaign/. Justice Ginsburg contends
that post-Citizens United, it is "exceedingly difficult to maintain that independent
expenditures by corporations 'do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption."' Id.
276.
Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer
for Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622,
635 (2010).
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incongruous with the marketplace of ideas that should prevail in
political discourse. The so-called "political speech protectionism,"
which has found vocal advocates in academia and all branches of
government, clashes with the ideal of "enlightened self-government,"
if not the Constitution. 277
VI. CONCLUSION

Limiting options of foreign-linked U.S. corporations for engaging
in the political process-namely making independent expenditureswould constitute an unjustified government restriction on speech.
This Note contests the premise that the political participation of
foreign-linked entities is a "problem." The massive amount of political
speech expressed in advertisements, stump speeches, position papers,
and traditional and new media requires a discerning electorate.
Given how technology has transformed the electoral process, the
"authenticity of [the] process may have to rely more on an informed
and responsibly [sic] populace than a regulatory framework always
struggling to keep pace."27 8 Foreign-controlled domestic corporations'
influence on political speech is relatively negligible and likely even
proportionally less than their amount donated in relation to the
overall donations. Moreover, these corporations contribute heavily to
the economy, investing and paying taxes. Withholding political
speech from domestic subsidiaries, which face regulatory burdens and
have U.S.-citizen employees who may wish to exercise their political
speech in conjunction with their corporate employer, neither jives
with policy nor other legal doctrines that treat subsidiaries equally.
In no uncertain terms, Congress ought to make clear that domestic
subsidiaries of foreign corporations are not foreign, and thus not
subject to the prohibition on expenditures. The government has a
"compelling interest" to permit domestic subsidiaries of foreign
corporations to influence the political process. 279
In a transnational economy, foreign-controlled organizations that
do business in the United States, including employing millions of
Americans, and "subject themselves to American law deserve some

277.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010)
("The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach
consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to
protect it.").
Stephen Reader, Explainer: Can Foreign Companies Make Political
278.
Donations?, WNYC (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/its-free-country/
2012/jan/20/explainer-can-foreign-companies-make-political-donations/#.
Section 104.20(c)(9) of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title II requires the
279.
disclosure of donations of $1,000 or more to corporations (including nonprofits) or labor
organizations when the donation "was made for the purpose of furthering
electioneering communications." 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2011).
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degree of input into the American political process." 2 80 Ultimately,
regulation of domestic subsidiaries' political speech in a manner
different from other corporate entities would likely fail under the
Court's strict scrutiny standard.2 81 After completing the prescriptive
measure discussed above (passage of a concurrent resolution),
Congress will have signaled and affirmed domestic subsidiaries'
corporate political-speech rights, which they deservedly should
receive.

[W]e apply the limitationsof the Constitution with no fear
that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse
or even contrary will disintegratethe social
organization.28 2
-Justice Jackson in West VirginiaState Board of Education v.
Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943)
Scott L. Friedman*

280.
lanelli, supra note 95, at 891.
281.
The Court may "defer to Congress's authority over foreign affairs in
restricting speech when these restrictions are narrowly drawn." Id. at 903; see also
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730-31 (2010) (evaluating a
statute regulating support with certain organizations under First and Fifth
Amendment limitations).
282.
Ronald Dworkin deemed Citizens United "the decision that threatens
democracy." Ronald Dworkin, The Decision that Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (May 13, 2010), http://www.nybooks.comlarticles/archives/2010/may/13/decisionthreatens-democracy/?page=2.
J.D. Candidate 2013, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A. 2010, Washington
University in St. Louis. The author would like to thank his parents, friends, and the
members of the Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw.

&

